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I. INTRODUCTION
When pharmaceutical companies create a new drug, they can usually
receive a patent, which allows them to operate with patent exclusivity for the
life of the patent. 1 This exclusive period allows drug companies to recoup
their massive research and development expenses and eventually become
profitable. 2 Without some amount of patent exclusivity, it becomes
economically irrational for a biotechnology company to invest the huge
amounts of time and money required for the development of a drug. 3 More
recently, costs for pharmaceutical research and development have
skyrocketed as traditional methods of small molecule drug development are
starting to appear more “tapped out.” 4 As a result, drug companies are
forced to turn to more cutting-edge and expensive methods of
development. 5
After a pharmaceutical company’s period of patent exclusivity elapses,
generic companies can enter the market and offer essentially the same drug
for a fraction of the price. 6 Before obtaining the approval of the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), a generic company must certify that the
branded drug: (1) has not been patented, (2) the applicable patents have
expired, (3) the patents will expire on a given date and the generic will not
be marketed before that date, or (4) the listed patents are not infringed or
invalid. 7
Generic companies do not have the same up-front research costs that
branded companies face. Additionally, since the introduction of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“HatchWaxman Act”), generic drug companies may undergo a shortened FDA
*Taylor Stemler is 2L student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law with a background in
biomedical engineering. He has tailored his legal education toward learning the patent system
and hopes to use his engineering experience to specialize his practice in patent law with a
focus on medical devices. Taylor would like to issue a special thanks to Chris Pinahs of
Robins Kaplan, LLP, for his help and guidance on this article.
Judge David M. Gersten, The Quest for Market Exclusivity in Biotechnology: Navigating
the Patent Minefield, 2 NEURORX 572, 572 (2005).
Id. at 573.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
1

2
3
4
5
6

Id.
Exclusivity and Generic Drugs: What Does It Mean?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (FDA),

https://www.fda.gov/media/111069/download [https://perma.cc/4Q3K-H4WR] (last visited
Oct. 31, 2019).
Himanshu Gupta, Suresh Kumar, Saroj Kumar Roy & R.S. Gaud, Patent Protection
Strategies, 2 J. PHARM. BIOALLIED SCI. 2, 4 (2010) (noting certifications required for generic
companies to obtain FDA approval under the Hatch-Waxman Act); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(2)(A) (2018).
7
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approval process. 8 Studies show that due to these limited upfront
expenditures, generic drug companies may undercut the prices of branded
drugs, thereby dropping the branded drug price as much as ninety percent
within the first 2.5 years of generic entry. 9
To combat these extreme price drops, some branded pharmaceutical
companies may choose to raise the price on branded drugs while they are
still patented to get the greatest value from their patent protection period. 10
Others have developed strategies to achieve a greater period of patent
exclusivity. 11 These strategies effectively extend the patent protection for the
products, which may minimize the damage from the drastic generic entry
price drop or prevent generic entry to the market altogether. 12 Tactics such
as developing new formulations, creating new routes of administration,
making changes to molecular structures, and finding new uses for products
have all been used in some ways by branded pharmaceutical companies. 13
One new strategy that this article will examine in depth relates to
patents on combination medicine and delivery device products. 14 Frequently
used combination products include pulmonary inhalers, injection systems,
or infusion systems. 15 This strategy presents a new set of challenges for
lawmakers to navigate, since drug companies can attain patent protection on
both the device and the underlying drug. After examining the ways in which
this strategy is employed, this article will explore impacts of this strategy on
patients and regulatory solutions that can mitigate its negative effects. 16
Lastly, one mitigation scheme will be identified as the best regulatory
pathway for future legislation in the United States. 17

Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications,
and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2019); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018); 35
8

U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018).
IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, PRICE DECLINES AFTER BRANDED MEDICINES
LOSE EXCLUSIVITY IN THE U.S. 2 (2016), https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/institutereports/price-declines-after-branded-medicines-lose-exclusivity-in-the-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EA7H-X56S].
Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J. L. BIOSCIENCE 590, 594 (2018).
Id. at 596.
Id. at 602.
See Gupta et al., supra note 7, at 4–6.
See infra Part IV.
Richard Featherstone, Combination Products: Human Factors & Combination Products,
15 DRUG DEV. & DELIVERY 22, 22 (2015), https://d2akihtr51eb46.cloudfront.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/MARCH-2015-WEB-FRIENDLY.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA7TJFKE].
See infra Sections IV.C–D.
See infra Section IV.D.
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
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II. BACKGROUND
Before exploring new patent extension strategies, it is helpful to
provide an overview of the drug development process along with a
discussion of pharmaceutical patenting and the Hatch-Waxman Act. An
understanding of these concepts is useful when discussing how lawmakers
have structured the regulatory pathway for new drugs in response to
gamesmanship in the Hatch-Waxman and pharmaceutical patent system.

A. New Drug Development and Approval Overview
Developing and obtaining FDA approval for a new drug typically takes
around twelve years and costs about $1.44 billion. 18 The process begins
when pharmaceutical companies supply grants to professors conducting
basic research in universities to understand the mechanisms behind the
diseases they hope to cure. 19 After identifying some target mechanism for
the potential treatment to attack, researchers employed by the
pharmaceutical company will look into natural components from plants,
animals, fungi, or other organisms to build a list of potential therapy
candidates. 20 This list may start with as many as 10,000 compounds, which
are then narrowed down to around ten or twenty most likely to cure the
disease. 21
Once the final list of candidates is created, the compounds will be
tested to ensure that they are safe and effective. Before the compounds are
used on humans, they may be tested using computer models, cells, and
animals. 22 This process will typically narrow down the list to between five
and ten remaining compounds. 23
After this laboratory testing phase, the potential drugs are then moved
into clinical trials. 24 There are three main pre-approval phases of clinical
trials. 25 Phase one trials are typically small and aim to determine the

Ingrid Torjesen, Drug Development: The Journey of a Medicine from Lab to Shelf,
PHARMACEUTICAL J. (May 12, 2015), https://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/publications/
tomorrows-pharmacist/drug-development-the-journey-of-a-medicine-from-lab-to
shelf/
20068196.article [https://perma.cc/3DNT-WUR6].
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-

process/step-3-clinical-research [https://perma.cc/756E-ZLLX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
25

Id.
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tolerance, side effects, and coping effects of the drug. 26 Phase two trials go
on to determine how well the new treatment works, how to best manage the
side effects, and the subtype of disease that the therapy works best on. 27
Lastly, phase three trials test a much larger group of patients and determine
how the treatment affects one’s quality of life compared to alternative
therapies. 28
After the successful completion of the clinical trials, which, in some
circumstances, may be even more extensive than what is outlined above, the
drug may be submitted for FDA approval. 29 Submissions also require the
completion of a New Drug Application (NDA). 30 When submitting an
NDA, the pharmaceutical company must list all of the patents relevant to its
new drug for publication in the FDA’s Orange Book. 31 Upon submission,
the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) evaluates the
drugs by weighing evidence from the clinical trials. 32 This independent and
unbiased review process is meant to determine whether the drug is safe and
effective, whether the labeling and packaging are appropriate, and what
manufacturing methods are appropriate for safe production. 33

B. Pharmaceutical Patenting
Patents help advance innovation in the pharmaceutical industry by
allowing inventors to recoup their costs and see a return on their research
and development investment. 34 Branded companies typically patent new
compounds very early in the drug research process to protect their
intellectual property from other drug developers. 35 Since the FDA’s drug
approval process can take an extremely long time, once a new drug finally
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
New Drug Application (NDA), FDA (June 10, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/typesapplications/new-drug-application-nda [https://perma.cc/3464-QLL7] [hereinafter New
Drug Application].
26
27
28
29
30

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018) (“[A relevant patent is] any patent which claims the drug for
which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug
and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a
person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”).
How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, FDA (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/how-drugs-are-developedand-approved [https://perma.cc/NK4F-Z2Z9].
New Drug Application, supra note 30.
See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 178 (2012).
Feldman, supra note 10, at 598.
31

32

33
34
35
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makes it to the market, often, a considerable amount of the life of the patent
has elapsed. Patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office last for twenty years. 36 However, estimates for the average life of
patent protection remaining once a drug finally reaches the market show
that the patent usually has only about twelve years left. 37
Pharmaceutical companies strive to extend the patent protection
period of their products by covering them under multiple patents, which
allows the companies to protect different aspects of an invention so that the
product cannot be copied after the primary patent elapses. 38 This practice
may fall within what has been nicknamed “patent evergreening.” Patent
evergreening is loosely defined as obtaining a secondary patent that extends
a product’s exclusivity period without a proportionate benefit of any sort. 39
In the healthcare context, the definition of evergreening has been modified
slightly to include secondary patents that extend a product’s exclusivity
period without a proportionate therapeutic benefit. 40
Provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which will be discussed in
greater detail in Section II.C., allow a patent holder to file for a patent-term
extension. 41 The length of the extension is based on the amount of time the
drug spent in the clinical testing and regulatory review phases of the drug
approval process. 42 As long as the patent was issued prior to clinical testing,
the patent term can be extended for one half of the clinical testing period,
plus the full length of the regulatory review period. 43 However, this extension
may be reduced if the patent holder did not act reasonably diligently during
clinical testing and regulatory review. 44 The patent extension period may not
exceed five years, and the total, extended patent life cannot exceed fourteen
years upon approval. 45

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (providing for twenty years of protection from the date of
filing the patent application).
Feldman, supra note 10, at 599.
36

37
38

Id.

Reed F. Beall, Jason W. Nickerson, Warren A. Kaplan & Amir Attaran, Is Patent
“Evergreening” Restricting Access to Medicine/Device Combination Products?, 11 PLOS
39

ONE 1, 8 (2016).
40
41

Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2018).

37 C.F.R. §§ 1.775–1.779 (2019).
Id. The calculation of the length of the extension period varies depending on the type of
product for which an extension is sought. Id.
John Murray & Heidi Dare, Patent Term Extension Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, BRINKS
GILSON & LIONE 1 (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.brinksgilson.com/files/
biopharma_article_3.3.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3PM-9PKZ].
42
43

44

45

Id.
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C. The Hatch-Waxman Act
To understand the methods and effects of pharmaceutical
evergreening, it is important to be familiar with the provisions of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984—the HatchWaxman Act. 46 This act was intended to provide an accelerated path for
generic entry while maintaining patent protection for branded
pharmaceutical companies. 47 Rather than requiring generic drug companies
to go through the entire new-drug approval process, the Hatch-Waxman Act
permits them to file an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) and
establish bioequivalence with the approved branded drug. 48 This
abbreviated process was meant to make more low-cost generic drugs
available to the public. 49
After the branded drug manufacturer receives approval of their NDA
by the FDA, the new drug is added to the FDA’s Orange Book. 50 When a
generic drug company seeks FDA approval of its product, it must show not
only bioequivalence but also that:
(1) the active ingredient of the generic drug is the same as that of
the pioneer drug; (2) the generic drug has the same route of
administration, dosage form and strength as the pioneer drug;
and (3) the generic drug’s labeling must be same as the labeling
of the pioneer drug. 51
Additionally, a generic drug company must certify that the patents
listed in the Orange Book by the named brand: (i) have not been filed, (ii)
are expired, (iii) will expire by a given date, or (iv) are invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new generic drug. 52 If the
generic drug applicant wishes to proceed under paragraph IV, it must
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360 (2018)).
Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the
Pharmaceutical
Scales
Balanced,
PHARM.
TIMES
(Aug.
15,
2009),
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplement0809/
generic-hatchwaxman-0809 [https://perma.cc/XVL7-4ANS].
46

47

48

Id.

H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984) (additionally stating that “[t]he availability of
generic versions of pioneer drugs approved after 1962 would save American consumers $920
million over the next 12 years”).
Orange Book Preface, FDA (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval-process-drugs/orange-book-preface [https://perma.cc/GCS7-RHB9].
Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman
Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 423 (2011) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2018)).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2018).
49

50

51

52
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provide notice to the patent holder and the NDA applicant with a detailed
explanation of why the patent is not infringed or should be declared
invalid. 53 If the NDA holder then brings a patent infringement lawsuit within
forty-five days of this notice, the FDA is barred from granting approval to
the ANDA holder for thirty months. 54 Otherwise, if no lawsuit is filed within
the forty-five-day period, or if the ANDA declares only Paragraph I or II
certifications, the FDA must approve the ANDA, provided that all other
approval requirements are satisfied. 55
As an incentive for generic companies to enter the market, the HatchWaxman Act allows the first generic ANDA applicant to enter the market
with a 180-day exclusivity period, during which no other generic companies
may be granted FDA approval. 56 This effectively allows the generic and
branded companies to share FDA exclusivity for a period of time. 57 The
idea behind this is to “encourage generic companies to challenge
questionably weak or invalid patents.” 58
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act seems to give generic manufacturers
many advantages throughout the path to market approval, there are
provisions within it that serve branded NDA holders as well. An NDA
holder may list additional patents in the Orange Book after an ANDA is
submitted, and if they do so, “the ANDA applicant must make additional
certifications within 30 days of the listing of the new patent.” 59 Further,
Hatch-Waxman creates additional FDA exclusivity periods for NDA
holders that prohibit generic manufacturers from submitting an ANDA for
three to five years after approval of the NDA. 60 NDA holders are entitled to
this exclusivity period regardless of whether the underlying patents on the

Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
Id.
Kelly, supra note 51, at 431 (citing Mary W. Bourke & M. Edward Danberg, Current
Trends in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation: A System Still in Flux, 878 PRACT. L. INST.,
939, 960 (2006); Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to Entry
in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
53
54
55
56
57
58

Cong. 8, 14 (2003) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC) (“[The 180-day
exclusivity] provision provides an incentive for companies to challenge patent validity and to
design around patents.”)).
Kelly, supra note 51, at 420 (citing Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of
59

the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 45 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 164, 174 (2004)).
Id.
60
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drug are expired. 61 Problems arising from these statutory provisions are
explained in the following section.

D. Evergreening Using the Hatch-Waxman Act
Although specific evergreening strategies will be discussed in more
detail in Parts III–IV below, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a general
framework that drug companies can leverage to extend the length of their
patent and FDA exclusivity periods and block generic competitors. 62 For
example, branded manufacturer, Marion Merrell Dow, took advantage of
the thirty-month stay provision for a secondary patent on their Seldane
product. After Baker Norton filed an ANDA claiming paragraph IV noninfringement, Marion sued for infringement even though, “[s]imply stated,
Baker Norton’s proposed activity [was] outside the scope of the . . . patent.” 63
However, in this case, the FDA still initiated the thirty-month stay. 64 Thus,
although Baker Norton was granted summary judgment on the infringement
issue, Marrion was able to take advantage of the entire thirty-month stay
period of exclusivity. 65
The FDA requires only patents related to drug substance, drug
formulation, and method of use to be submitted to the Orange Book. 66 This
rule also explicitly prohibits patents related to the “packaging, metabolites,
or intermediates” from being included with the NDA. 67 Interestingly,
however, the FDA does not have any “regulatory mechanisms for reviewing
patent listings” made by NDA holders. 68 In fact, the FDA has expressed that
it does not even conduct a “review of submitted patent information to
determine, at least on a very general basis, applicability to the particular
NDA in question.” 69 Accordingly, in the interest of preventing competitors

61
62

Id.
See infra Parts III–IV.

Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (S.D.
Fla. 1996).
Id. at 1051 n.3.
Id. at 1057.
FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 5 (2002),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patentexpiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B9M-QNGV].
Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,678 (June
18, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
See id. at 36,683.
Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed.
Reg. 50,338, 50,343 (Oct. 3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
63

64
65
66

67

68
69
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from entering the market, NDA holders often take wide latitudes when
determining the types of patents to list in the Orange Book. 70
NDA holders may also “late-list” patents that were not included in the
original NDA. 71 If an NDA holder lists a patent in the Orange Book after a
generic company files an ANDA, the ANDA applicant must still make a
certification regarding the newly listed patent. 72 Although the 2003
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act do not allow for the NDA holder
to obtain a second thirty-month stay against an ANDA applicant, a
Paragraph IV certification may result in patent infringement litigation
between the NDA holder and the ANDA applicant, the costs of which may
ultimately deter an ANDA applicant from entering the market. 73
III. HISTORICAL PHARMACEUTICAL EVERGREENING STRATEGIES AND
RESPONSES
Pharmaceutical evergreening often involves obtaining secondary
patents on features of a drug other than the main active ingredient.
Secondary patents may cover aspects of the product, such as a tablet’s
coating, alternate crystalline structures of the drug, or methods of use. 74
These secondary patents are often weaker than the original patent on the
drug itself; however, they may still be used to either delay a generic drug’s
market approval or make market entry prohibitively expensive. 75

A. New Uses
1. Overview and Examples
New uses for a drug currently on the market will sometimes allow a
drug developer to obtain new method-of-use patents. 76 Thus, developing

Kelly, supra note 51, at 438 (citing Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating
Hatch-Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250
70

(1999)).
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(d)(3) (2019).
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(i)(4) & (6), 314.94(a)(12)(vi) & (viii) (2019).
Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36676.
Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A
Case Study of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31
HEALTH AFF. 2286 (2012).
Id. at 2286–87.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
717, 720 (2005).
71
72
73
74

75
76
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new uses for a patented drug may help the patent holder maximize research
dollars and prolong the commercial life of the drug. 77
Several pharmaceutical companies have successfully deployed this new
method-of-use patenting strategy. 78 One example of this is Merck’s patents
for its branded versions of the drug Finasteride. 79 Finasteride is the active
ingredient in Proscar, a drug first patented by Merck in 1992 for treating
enlarged prostates with a five-milligram tablet. 80 When Proscar came off
patent in 2006, the FDA approved Merck’s competitors to begin
manufacturing and selling generic versions of Proscar. 81
However, in 1997, Merck received a second patent on Finasteride
when it proved that a lower one-milligram dose of the drug could help treat
male pattern baldness. 82 Using the protection from this patent, Merck
continued marketing Finasteride as a one-milligram pill under the brand
name Propecia for treating baldness at a price twenty-six times greater than
it could have with Proscar. 83
Some criticize “use patents” that pharmaceutical companies obtain and
attempt to deploy as unfair evergreening. 84 Supporting this viewpoint is the
fact that method-of-use patents have allowed branded competition to extend
their patent exclusivity in the United States for an average of 7.4 years. 85
However, as traditional methods for discovering new drugs become less
successful and more expensive, the idea of discovering new uses for old
drugs is gaining in popularity. 86
One example illustrates just how important use patents can be to
society. Although originally created and marketed as a potential treatment
for cancer, azidothymidine was later found to be an effective treatment for
77

Gupta et al., supra note 7, at 6.

78

Id. at 6.
Id.

79

Marc Joffe, The Strange and Very Expensive World of Prescription Drugs, MERCATUS
CTR. (Nov. 1, 2010), https://www.mercatus.org/expert_commentary/strange-and-veryexpensive-world-prescription-drugs [https://perma.cc/Z8EP-YS7R].
80

81
82

Id.
Id.

Gupta et al., supra note 7, at 6; see also Jonathan J. Darrow, The High Cost of Health Care:
Why Some Pay $240 for a $9 Bottle of Pills, HARV. L.: PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (Feb. 15, 2003),

83

http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/15/the-high-cost-of-health-care-why-somepay-240-for-a-9-bottle-of-pills [https://perma.cc/W8KJ-7PJ8]; Joffe, supra note 80.
Arti K. Rai & Grant Rice, Use Patents Can Be Useful: The Case of Rescued Drugs, 6 SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 248, 248 (2014).
Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park, & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh
My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 5
(2012).
Rai & Rice, supra note 84.
84

85

86
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helping patients with HIV. 87 It is unlikely that, without the patent incentive
for this new use of the drug, azidothymidine would have been worth the
additional research and development investment to find new uses and gain
new approvals. 88

2. Skinny Labeling
More recently, patents on new uses have become less valuable due to
the FDA now allowing generic drugs to engage in a practice known as
“skinny labeling.” 89 As stated before, generic companies are allowed to
manufacture and sell an off-patent drug for an off-patent use once their
ANDA is approved by the FDA. 90 When marketing the generic version of
the drug, the ANDA applicant may only list the off-patent uses on the drug’s
label. 91 However, if the branded company receives a patent and FDA
approval for a new use of the drug, physicians may still prescribe the generic
skinny-labeled version for this patented new use. 92 Thus, a branded drug
company can invest heavily in clinical trials and regulatory submissions to
have an alternative use approved, only to be immediately undercut by
physicians prescribing skinny-labeled generic drugs in place of the branded
drug marketed and labeled for that use. 93
The Federal Circuit has validated this practice by holding that mere
knowledge by a generic company that its product is being used to infringe
patent rights is insufficient to show induced infringement. 94 Rather, the
Federal Circuit requires the generic company to have actually marketed the
product for the infringing use. 95 Thus, by merely selling the drugs that
physicians prescribe for a patented use, generic manufacturers do not
infringe the branded drug patents.

Adam Houldsworth, Pressure Piles on US Pharma and Biotech IP Owners, IAM (Jan. 31,
2019),
https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/why-evergreening-not-dirty-word
[https://perma.cc/7A5G-ESZQ].

87

88

Id.

89

Rai & Rice, supra note 84.
See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (discussing the off-patent use of Proscar).
Rai & Rice, supra note 84.
Id.
Id.

90
91
92
93
94

Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

95

Id. at 1365.
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3. Branded Response to Skinny Labeling
a. Use Codes
To prevent generic skinny labeling, brand-name companies have also
submitted overly broad use code claims to the FDA Orange Book to
artificially increase the scope of their patented uses, thereby limiting the
ability of generic companies to identify and list an unprotected use on their
labels. 96 This practice can be effective because, as mentioned before, the
FDA plays a very limited role in screening out overly broad Orange Book
submissions. 97
However, in Caraco, the United States Supreme Court determined
that overly broad use codes submitted to the FDA’s Orange Book could be
challenged by generic companies. 98 In Caraco, Novo Nordisk’s only
unexpired patent covered a fairly narrow use—treating non-insulindependent diabetes through a combination of its drug, repaglinide, and
another drug, metformin. 99 In contrast, the Orange Book use code that was
claimed by Novo Nordisk attempted to cover every method of “improving
glycemic control in adults with type 2 diabetes.” 100 This much broader claim
effectively prevented generic companies from skinny labeling the drug and
marketing it for any use. 101 In its opinion, the Court held that the 2003
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act allowed generic companies to file
a counterclaim to correct an overly broad use code listed in the Orange
Book. 102 Absent the ability to do so, a generic drug company would be
unable to market its product for any non-infringing uses. 103
The Caraco decision seems to follow both the statutory language and
legislative intent behind the 2003 Hatch-Waxman amendments. 104 The
practices employed by Novo Nordisk had been thoroughly documented by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and served as an impetus for the new
legislation. 105 However, as noted in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, the
Gregory J. Glover, ANDA Section VIII Label Carve-Outs Explained, PHARM. L. GROUP
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.pharmalawgrp.com/blog/1/anda-section-viii-label-carve-outsexplained/ [https://perma.cc/P49Q-82SN].
Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,683.
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 425–26 (2012).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410.
Arti K. Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives—A New Battle in the Drug-Patent
Wars, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491, 492 (2012).
Caraco, 566 U.S. at 426.
96

97
98
99

100
101

102
103

Id.

104

Rai, supra note 101.
Id.; see also FTC, supra note 66, at 1.
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2003 amendments are suboptimal for generic companies. 106 To correct an
overly broad use-listing in the Orange Book, a generic company must first
provoke the branded company into suing it for patent infringement by filing
a paragraph IV invalidity or noninfringement certification. 107
Justice Sotomayor noted two potential problems with this requirement.
First, it undoubtedly requires the generic company to incur significant
expenses in litigation and further delays generic entry. 108 Second, the statute
is silent on what would happen if the branded company did not launch a
lawsuit against the generic paragraph IV applicant. 109 The FDA might still
approve the ANDA. 110 If, however, the generic company was approved, the
generic company would be forced into marketing the product with a label
identical to the branded manufacturer’s. 111 In this case, the generic company
would likely then be liable to the branded company for induced
infringement of the underlying patent. 112 Either way, the generic company is
placed in a tough position.

b. Rescue Drugs
In certain situations, good faith patenting on legitimate secondary uses
may still allow branded drug companies to prevent themselves from being
immediately undercut by physicians prescribing skinny-labeled generic
drugs. These situations involve drugs that went through the clinical trial
stage, were determined to be safe for use in humans, but were ultimately
abandoned due to lack of efficacy. 113 Often, these abandoned drugs are old,
and the original patent on their chemical composition expired.
Rediscovering, repurposing, and patenting these drugs for a different
use than that originally intended can help deliver new therapies to patients
while still allowing drug companies to see a return on their investments.
These “rescue drug” method-of-use patents allow companies to maintain
patent protection just as they would with a composition-of-matter patent. 114
Because there is no FDA approved, off-patent use for the rescue drugs,
there is no way for generic companies to skinny label around the branded
106
107
108
109
110

Caraco, 566 U.S. at 426 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)) (“[W]ithout prejudice to infringement claims the

patent owner might assert when the ANDA applicant produces or markets the generic
drug.”).
111
112

Id.
Id. at 428.

113

Rai & Rice, supra note 84.

114

Id.
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drugs. 115 Without this type of patent protection, there would be no financial
incentive for a company to investigate or work to approve new uses for
already developed drugs. 116 Therefore, patients would stand to lose out on
many therapies that could otherwise be available. 117
One of the more famous examples of utilizing a method-of-use patent
for an initially failed drug is the erectile dysfunction (ED) drug, Viagra. 118
Although Viagra was ineffective and abandoned for treating hypertension, it
was found to be useful for treating ED. 119 After obtaining a method-of-use
patent in 1994, the patent was successfully upheld and asserted in an
infringement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. 120

B. New Formulations
1. Overview and Examples
A pharmaceutical company may also choose to patent a new
formulation of a drug to extend its patented life. Often, these new
formulations may involve new strengths and dosage forms of the previous
product. 121 These new formulations may be protected by additional patents
and may receive a three-year period of exclusivity for “new clinical
investigation” under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 122 Studies have shown that the
practice of introducing new pharmaceutical formulations may be so
prevalent that about half of the new small-molecule drugs approved in 2002
have introduced new formulation products, usually within five years of
launching the original product. 123
In one illustrative example, a new formulation allowed the branded
manufacturer to maintain several additional years of patent protection after
115
116
117

Id.
Id.
Id.

Savvas Kerdemelidis, Deadly Gaps in the Patent System: An Analysis of Current
and Alternative Mechanisms for Incentivising Development of Medical Therapies 88 (2014)
(unpublished Master of Laws thesis, University of Canterbury) (on file with University of
Canterbury libraries).
118

119
120
121

Id.
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D. Va. 2011).
Reed F. Beall et al., New Drug Formulations and Their Respective Generic Entry Dates,

25 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 218, 218 (2019).
Renu Lal, Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRONICLES 2 (May 19, 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance
/ucm447307.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BJJ-XXZP].
Beall et al., supra note 121, at 219.
122

123
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generic companies entered the market. 124 Otsuka developed an aripiprazole
that is used to treat mental conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar mania,
and major depressive disorder. 125 After generic companies entered the
market and began competing with Otsuka with the original tablet form of
the medication, Otsuka developed an injectable, extended-release
formulation of the product that allowed them to maintain a monopoly over
the extended-release form. 126 The injectable formulation had some benefits,
such as less frequent administration, which was likely to benefit certain
patients in need. 127 This new formulation is an example of a pharmaceutical
innovation for which patients were willing to pay a premium price.
At its core, new formulations of drugs certainly do have some positive
effects. New formulations are typically introduced shortly after approval of
the original product. 128 If a drug company wants to extend the length of its
patent protection with new formulations, it may be more inclined to wait
until its original patents are about to expire before obtaining additional
patents on new formulations. The fact that this is generally not the case
indicates that, rather than solely trying to extend the life of their patent
protection, some drug companies are attempting to provide greater choices
to patients who are unable to use the original formulation of the product. 129
This practice further suggests that at least some manufacturers are merely
being diligent by continuously improving their products and striving to add
value for a larger patient base. 130
Additionally, since the scope of these secondary patents is narrower,
they achieve the dual purpose of creating an incentive to research new
therapeutic benefits of a product without blocking access to the drug itself. 131
The new formulation patents do not extend the term of the original patent
on the chemical compound. 132 Accordingly, after the original composition
124

Id. at 222.

John P. Cunha, Aripiprazole, RXLIST (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.rxlist.com/consumer_
aripiprazole_abilify/drugs-condition.htm [https://perma.cc/JDE5-RT8J].
125

126
127

Id.
Id.

128

Beall et al., supra note 121, at 222.

129

Id.
Id.

130

Christopher M. Holman, Timo Minssen & Eric M. Solovy, Patentability Standards for
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 131, 132 (2018) (citing
Eric M. Solovy and Pavan S. Krishnamurthy, TRIPS Agreement Flexibilities and Their
Limitations: A Response to the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on Access
to Medicines, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 69, 106 (2017)).
Id. at 137 (citing Solovy & Krishnamurthy, supra note 131) (“Granting patents on
131

132

improvements to prior formulations of a product encourages pharmaceutical companies to
innovate, creating new products with improved safety and/or effectiveness over existing
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of the matter patent expires, there is no patent-based restriction on the
generic companies entering the market and competing with branded
products. 133
Some say that unless this secondary patent covers a valuable new
advancement that consumers are willing to pay for, it will essentially be
worthless and not have any impact on the market for the original drug. 134 In
theory, this is because consumers, who see the much more expensive
patented drug, will be able to determine that the value of the patented
advancement is not proportional to the increased cost. In that case, the
consumer will instead opt for the cheaper generic version of the original offpatent product. 135 Indeed, a leading patent expert, Judge Giles Rich of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has expressed, “A monopoly
on something nobody wants is pretty much . . . a nullity. That is one of the
beauties of the patent system. The reward is measured automatically by the
popularity of the contribution.” 136
Unfortunately, however, the pharmaceutical industry does not always
work so neatly. The pharmaceutical market requires the doctor to select the
drug for the patient. 137 Because the doctor does not bear the cost of the
prescription, often they will not even know or consider the price of the drug,
and patients have minimal say in selecting a cheaper alternative. 138 In this
way, the pharmaceutical market does not function like a free market
economy, and, as a result, Judge Rich’s theory breaks down. 139 Certain
tactics, such as the product hop, show how these unique aspects of the
pharmaceutical industry permit gamesmanship of the patent system and the
Hatch-Waxman Act by pharmaceutical companies.

2. The Product Hop
One strategy that patent holders often employ is the product hop.
Although product hopping can be used with other secondary patenting
methods, it is useful to include in this section on new formulations because
the most popular examples of product hopping have featured patents on
pharmaceutical products, but without removing older and less expensive variants from the
market.”).
133
134
135
136

Id.
Id. at 137–38.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 138 (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393,

402 (1960)).
New York v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 645–46 (2d Cir. 2015).
137
138
139

Id.
Id.; see also Rich, supra note 136.
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new formulations. 140 As illustrated in the following cases, product hopping
involves using provisions within the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent laws, and
drug substitution laws to block generic competition and ensure that patients
continue to purchase monopolized products. The tactic has been combated
with mixed success using antitrust laws. 141

C. New York v. Actavis PLC (Namenda)
Actavis developed a patented drug called Namenda IR for treating
Alzheimer’s patients. 142 However, as the Namenda IR patents were set to
expire in 2015, generic companies began preparing to rush into the market
with low-cost alternatives. 143 Shortly before the IR patent’s expiration,
Actavis went on to announce a newly patented, extended-release
formulation, Namenda XR, which would not come off patent until 2029. 144
The XR formulation only required drug administration once per day, rather
than the twice-a-day IR formulation. 145 To transfer patients to its newly
patent-protected product, Actavis began promoting the XR formulation to
doctors, pharmacists, and caregivers while temporarily lowering the price of
the XR below that of the IR version. 146 Months before the release of generic
Namenda IR, Actavis announced that they would discontinue selling
Namenda IR. 147 Since the branded IR formulation was no longer on the
market, drug substitution laws did not allow prescriptions to be substituted
for the generic formulation. 148
In response to Actavis’s actions, the State of New York filed a
complaint seeking to block Actavis’s product hop, alleging that Actavis was
See Namenda, 787 F.3d at 645–46 (involving a product hop to a new extended release
formulation of the drug); see also Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co.
(Doryx), 838 F.3d 421, 429 (3d Cir. 2016) (involving product hops to various new tablet
formulations).
See Namenda, 787 F.3d at 655–58 (holding that introducing a new patented formulation
while simultaneously pulling the soon-to-be off-patent formulation from the market violated
provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Doryx, 838 F.3d at 438–39 (finding that
defendants actions were not anticompetitive because plaintiff was advantaged by its 180-day
exclusivity period and other substitute drug options remained available for consumers).
Karshtedt, supra note 8, at 1168.
Namenda, 787 F.3d at 645–46.
Id. at 647.
Memantine Hydrochloride—Drug Summary, PRESCRIBERS’ DIGITAL REFERENCE,
https://www.pdr.net/drug-summary/Namenda-XR-memantine-hydrochloride2438#targetText=CrCl%205%20to%2029%20mL,(XR)%20form%20is%20recommended
[https://perma.cc/EK2J-4PES] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
Namenda, 787 F.3d at 648.
140

141

142
143
144
145

146
147
148

Id.
Id.
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violating provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 149 To show that Actavis
was violating the law, New York had to prove “(1) that the defendant ha[d]
engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
power.” 150
The Second Circuit found that by introducing the new XR formulation
while simultaneously withdrawing the IR formulation, patients were forced
into switching prescriptions, which impeded generic competition and
amounted to anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 151
In reaching this conclusion, the court examined both the consumer
coercion effects and the likely impediment to competition. 152 Lastly, a
“dangerous probability” of monopoly power was present because of the
unique characteristics of the Alzheimer’s pharmaceutical market and the
way the product-hopping scheme could circumvent drug substitution laws. 153

D. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Co. (Doryx)
To receive approval of an ANDA, a generic company must first show
that its product is bioequivalent and therapeutically equivalent to the
branded product. 154 If the generic company both proves measures of
equivalence and earns an AB rating, state laws permit pharmacists to
substitute the generic for the branded prescription. To achieve an AB rating
for drug tablets, 155 most state laws require generic companies to demonstrate
that their tablets are identical in size and scoring to the branded drug. 156
Doryx, an off-patent doxycycline hyclate capsule used for treating acne,
was approved by the FDA in 1985. 157 After facing unsuccessful sales on the
capsule product, Mayne, the drug manufacturer, and Warner, the
149
150

Id. at 649; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018).
Namenda, 787 F.3d at 651 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,

456 (1993)).
Id. at 654.
Id. at 654–58.
Id. at 655.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2018).
Generally, multisource drug products with identical active ingredients, strength, dosage
forms, and routes of administration are coded as AB if the data demonstrate bioequivalence.
Orange Book Preface, FDA, supra note 50 (citation omitted). AB-rated drugs are drugs that
meet the necessary bioequivalence standards established by the Food and Drug
Administration. What is an AB-Rated Drug (Non-AB-Rated Drug), TAKERX,
www.takerx.com/abrated.html [https://perma.cc/XBY9-4C37] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co. (Doryx), 838 F.3d 421, 428 (3d Cir.
2016).
Id. at 429.
151
152
153
154
155

156

157
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distributor (collectively “Mayne”), decided to develop a new extendedrelease tablet formulation of the drug. 158 After receiving FDA approval for
the tablet, Mayne stopped selling the capsule formulation. 159
Later, Mayne proceeded to implement a sequence of changes to the
capsule size and scoring, each of which would require generic
manufacturers to file a new ANDA and await regulatory approval before
returning to market and benefiting from drug substitution laws. 160 To
compete with Mayne, Mylan developed each iteration and obtained ANDA
approval for each of the four changes before subsequently being shut out of
the market when Mayne pulled its previous designs from the shelves. 161
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Mayne indeed
changed its tablets primarily to delay generic market entry, the court found
that the conduct did not create a dangerous possibility of monopoly
power. 162 To reach this conclusion, the court noted that the relevant market
should include more than just Doryx and, accordingly, examined all oral
tetracyclines used to treat acne. 163 When viewed from this broader
perspective, Mayne held only eighteen percent of the market. 164
Consequently, the court held that Mayne’s conduct did not rise to the level
prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust Act. 165

E. Reconciling Namenda and Doryx
In both Namenda and Doryx, courts found that discontinuing a
product on its own does not amount to exclusionary conduct. 166 Under an
antitrust analysis, courts must find some additional coercive conduct by the
branded company that forces consumers to purchase their products. 167 This
question can be especially complicated and nuanced for judges and juries
who are unfamiliar with the complexities of the pharmaceutical industry to
make an informed decision. 168 It involves a combination of analyzing
complicated antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id.
Id.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 440–41.

Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 169 (2016).
168
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drug substitution laws. 169 Accordingly, the antitrust analysis is especially
prone to deliver inconsistent and ill-informed results. Indeed, courts have
acknowledged that they are ill-equipped to handle these types of decisions. 170

F. Chiral Switches
1. Chirality Explained
Two-thirds of the drugs currently on the market contain chiral
molecules. 171 Simply put, a chiral molecule lacks symmetry within its
molecular structure. 172 As a result, chiral molecules have counterparts called
enantiomers that are mirror images of the chiral molecules. 173 A mix of two
different enantiomers is known as a racemic mixture. 174
The body typically interacts with different enantiomers in different
ways. 175 Usually, one enantiomer—the eutomer—will have more desired
bioactive effects, while the other enantiomer—the distomer—is biologically
inactive or even toxic to humans. 176 Originally, drugs were primarily racemic
mixtures. 177 However, in the 1980s, scientists began purifying these mixtures
into just their therapeutically beneficial enantiomers. 178 In some cases, when
purified, the drugs may be taken in smaller doses or have fewer associated
side effects. 179

169
170

Id.
See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991,

1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To weigh the benefits of an improved product design against the
resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it is unadministrable. There are no criteria
that courts can use to calculate the ‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social
gains and minimize competitive injury.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935,
948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Antitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability of having
courts oversee product design, and any dampening of technological innovation would be at
crosspurposes with antitrust law.”).
Lien Ai Nguyen, Hua He & Chuong Pham-Huy, Chiral Drugs: An Overview, 2 INT. J.
BIOMEDICAL SCI. 85, 85 (2006).
Id. at 89.
171

172
173
174
175
176

Id.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 94.
Id.

Israel Agranat, Hava Caner & John Caldwell, Putting Chirality to Work: The Strategy of
Chiral Switches, 1 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 753, 753 (2002).
Id. at 753–754.
Id. at 754.
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2. Overview and Examples
When developing a new drug, the FDA gives developers some leeway
to choose their own stereochemistry as long as they demonstrate an
understanding of the effects of the different enantiomers. 180 As a result,
strategic thinking about patent protection for the new drug may play a role
in decisions regarding the stereochemistry of the drug. In particular,
companies may first opt to patent a slightly less effective racemic mixture
and later obtain a patent on the eutomer once the patent term is close to
expiration. 181 This chiral switch has been estimated to extend the patent life
for an additional five years. 182 Interestingly, at least one study has found that
many blockbuster single enantiomer drugs show no evidence of superiority
to their older racemic mixture counterparts. 183
An example of the chiral-switch patent extension method can be seen
with Nexium, developed by AstraZeneca. AstraZeneca originally obtained
a patent and FDA approval for the racemic Prilosec to treat acid reflux. 184
By 2000, Prilosec was the best-selling medicine in the world and was earning
$5 billion a year in the United States alone. 185 By 2003, when the Prilosec
patent expired, the company was already actively advertising a newly
patented enantiomer version of Nexium. 186 Because Prilosec had no major
side effects, switching from the racemic mixture to the enantiomer provided
no significant clinical benefits to patients. 187 AstraZeneca also was successful
in switching Prilosec and its generic counterparts onto the over-the-counter
market while maintaining a prescription status for Nexium. By doing this,
the company was able to further thwart generic competition by creating the
illusion that the new prescription Nexium was the stronger product. 188

180
181

Id. at 755.
Id.

W.H. Brooks, W.C. Guida & K.G. Kaniel, The Significance of Chirality in Drug Design
and Development, 11 CURRENT TOPICS IN MED. CHEMISTRY 760, 763 (2011) (specifically §
182

2.2.1).

See Walid F. Gellad, Phillip Choi, Margaret Mizah, Chester B. Good & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Assessing the Chiral Switch: Approval and Use of Single-Enantiomer Drugs, 20
AM. J. MANAGED CARE e90, e90 (2014).

183

184

Id.

Merrill Goozner, From The $800 Million Pill—Me Too!, 6 MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. 57, 67
(2004).
Joffe, supra note 80.
Goozner, supra note 185, at 83.
Id. at 84.

185

186
187
188

2020]

MINOR ADVANCES, MAJOR CONSEQUENCES

677

IV. DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATION AS A PATENT EXTENSION STRATEGY

A. Drug-Device Combination Products Explained
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, a combination product
is “[a] product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e.,
drug/device, biologic/device, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that are
physically, chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a
single entity.” 189 As technological advances continue to blur the lines between
product types, the FDA expects to receive more and more combination
products for review. 190 Currently, the most common types of drug-device
combination products include pulmonary inhalers, injection systems, and
infusion systems. 191 Other frequently seen combination products include
nasal sprays, creams, eye drops, ear drops, drug-eluting stents, and
transdermal patches. 192 Many conditions, such as asthma, diabetes, and
allergic reactions, are often treated using a medicine paired with a specific
device. 193

B. Overview and Examples
Medicines and devices that are used together are typically patentable
separately from one another. 194 By patenting the medicine and the device,
companies can prolong their patent exclusivity since the various device
patents can typically outlast those for the medicine itself. 195
Additionally, section 3038 of the 21st Century Cures Act of 2016
creates an expedited regulatory pathway for patenting combination products
with an already approved constituent part and allows drug-device
combination patents, also referred to as tertiary patents, to be listed in the
Orange Book. 196 By listing these patents in the Orange Book, drug-device
189

21 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2019).

About Combination Products, FDA (June 18, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/combinationproducts/about-combination-products [https://perma.cc/3DQN-FRQR].
Featherstone, supra note 15, at 22.
190

191
192

Id.

193

Beall et al., supra note 39, at 2.

194

Id.

Reed F. Beall & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Tertiary Patenting on Drug-Device Combination
Products in the United States, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, 142, 142 (2018) (explaining
195

that device patents typically outlast the patents on the drug itself because device patents can
be updated and patented incrementally).
Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3038, 130 Stat. 1033, 1105–10 (2016) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 353(g), 360(j)(h)(4) (2018)); Sydney R. Kestle, Paula E. Miller & David K. Mroz,
Should Drug-Delivery Device Patents Be Listed in the Orange Book?, AM. PHARM. REV.
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.americanpharmaceuticalreview.com/Featured-Articles/341252196
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combination product manufacturers are better able to prevent generic entry
by requiring generics to either await the expiration of the patents or make a
paragraph IV certification and risk being sued for infringement. 197 While the
FDA explicitly prohibits listing patents related to the packaging of drugs,
interestingly, the agency is silent on whether drug delivery patents that do
not claim the drug itself should be placed in the Orange Book. 198 However,
by not rejecting listings after several pharmaceutical companies have
explicitly notified the agency about listing these patents, it seems that the
FDA has acquiesced to this practice. 199
Because medical devices are typically developed (and patented) after
the drug itself, the younger device patent normally outlives the patent on its
associated drug. Also, the mechanical drug-delivery devices are generally
easier to modify and patent than the drugs with which they are used in
combination. 200 Accordingly, where the patents on drugs expire and
potential modifications are limited, device patents can be extended much
longer and provide increased patent protection. 201 By allowing drug-device
patents to be listed in the Orange Book, the FDA has permitted
pharmaceutical companies claiming a delivery device to benefit for an
additional 4.7 years of patent protection on average. 202
A recent study has found that the practice of obtaining and listing
patents on the drug delivery device has increased in the past twenty years. 203
In 2000, forty-two drug-device combination products existed on the market
with twenty-nine associated device patents. 204 In 2016, however, 127 drug-

Should-Drug-Delivery-Device-Patents-Be-Listed-In-the-Orange-Book/
[https://perma.cc/ZS2D-25SP] (citing Section 3038 of the 21st Century Cures Act of 2016).
Kestle et al., supra note 196.
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2019); see also Kestle, Miller & Mroz, supra note 196 (citations
omitted).
GlaxoSmithKline Request for Advisory Opinion Concerning “Orange Book” Listing of
Patents, FDA Docket No. 2005A-0015 (Jan. 10, 2005); Ropes & Gray on behalf of
AstraZeneca, Request for Advisory Opinion Concerning “Orange Book” Listing of Patents,
FDA Docket No. 2006A-0318 (Aug. 10, 2006); Ropes & Gray on behalf of AstraZeneca,
Request for an Advisory Opinion—“Orange Book” Listings of Patents, FDA Docket No.
2007A.026 (June 21, 2007); Finnegan on behalf of Forest Laboratories, Inc., Request for
Advisory Opinion Regarding Patents Listable in the Orange Book in connection with NDA
No. 202-450, FDA Docket No. FDA-2011-A-0363 (May 12, 2011); Novo Nordisk Inc.,
Request for Advisory Opinion, FDA Docket No. 2012A-1169 (Nov. 26, 2012).
Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195.
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198
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device combination products were on the market, and 478 device patents
were associated with them. 205
This increase in device patenting can likely be attributed to three main
causes. First, device patenting is playing a larger role in combination
products’ patent portfolio. 206 This is largely due to the tendency of device
patenting to extend the life of a product’s patent protection longer than the
patent for the drug itself. 207 In fact, in 2016, thirty-two drug products were
covered exclusively by tertiary device patents. 208 Second, more combination
products now list a larger number of device patents related to the product. 209
Studies have found that, on average, drug-device products list two patents
on the drug itself and three patents on the delivery device, while thirteen
percent listed ten or more patents for the delivery device. 210 Third,
companies accrued device patents more frequently than other patents
relating to the product. 211 Again, this is likely because mechanical
modifications to the delivery device are more readily updated and patented
than their pharmaceutical counterparts.
It has been suggested that drugs with a more niche, specialized market
typically experience fewer paragraph IV patent challenges than those with
larger scale consumer bases. 212 One likely reason for this could be that the
smaller market for more niche drugs is not sufficient to make up for the
expenses incurred by a generic company following patent litigation after the
paragraph IV challenge. As many drug-device combination products serve
these types of specialized markets, more of the delivery device patents may
go unchallenged, thus further delaying generic market entry and
incentivizing companies to list patents further unrelated to their associated
medicine. 213
While some have criticized the FDA’s practice of allowing patents on
associated delivery devices to be listed in the Orange Book, in a draft
guidance report, the FDA has clarified its position on why it considers
mechanical aspects of delivery systems as part of the “drug product,” making
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them listable. 214 As noted in the report, since the mechanical components of
the delivery system are thought to work in concert with the drug system, they
are deemed “integral” to the drug product. 215 Because these components are
designed to dispense extremely accurate amounts of a drug, any changes in
a component could lead to a change in the dose of the drug administered
to the patient. Therefore, the FDA seems to believe patents on delivery
devices are necessary for review and listing in the Orange Book. 216
Yet, recent litigation in the First Circuit suggests otherwise and points
to the FDA’s statements that “[t]he key factor is whether the patent being
submitted claims the finished dosage form of the approved drug product.” 217
Thus, the First Circuit concluded that components of the drug device that
do not claim the drug itself are ineligible for listing in the Orange Book. 218
The First Circuit decision comes at a time where the FDA is “unable to
reach a decision [on the matter] . . . due to the need to address other Agency
priorities.” 219 It seems likely that in the absence of clear FDA guidance,
courts will continue to fill in and create their own rules for how delivery
device Orange Book listings ought to be handled. 220

C. Effects on Population
Permitting companies to list drug-device patents in the Orange Book,
thereby impeding generic competition, has several potential effects on
patients who use them. The epinephrine autoinjector, known as the EpiPen,

Terry G. Mahn, Michael A. Siem & Elizabeth M. Flanagan, Orange Book Listing
Opportunities for Drug-Device Combinations, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 18, 2011),
214
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Id. (citing FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: METERED DOSE INHALER (MDI) AND
DRY POWDER INHALER (DPI) DRUG PRODUCTS 60 (2003)).
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Cesar Castillo, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC (In re Lantus Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litig.), 950 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New
Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on
Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug
Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed 68 Fed. Reg. 36,680 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 314)).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
See Sara Koblitz, If FDA Won’t Regulate, Maybe the Courts Will: First Circuit Opines on
Listing Device Patents in the Orange Book, HYMAN, PHELPS, & MCNAMARA: FDA L. BLOG
(Mar. 16, 2020), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2020/03/if-fda-wont-regulate-maybe-the-courtswill-first-circuit-opines-on-listing-device-patents-in-the-orange-book/
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is used for treating severe allergic reactions. 221 Although epinephrine, the
active ingredient in the EpiPen, was first isolated over 100 years ago, the
product saw price increases of over 400% from 2016 to 2018. 222 The primary
cause of this price increase was the patents on the drug delivery device. 223 In
2015, an estimated 3.6 million Americans were prescribed an EpiPen. 224
Although Mylan, the drug manufacturer, has now released a cheaper
generic version, at its peak, the EpiPen cost consumers over $700. With an
expiration date of only eighteen months from the date of manufacture,
American consumers were spending an estimated $1.8 billion per year on
EpiPens. 225 After the generic version of the EpiPen was released, the price
dropped to as low as $150. 226 Collectively, this could mean that the device
patents on the EpiPen costed Americans as much as $1.4 billion more for
essentially the same products.
In addition to the EpiPen, another commonly patented drug delivery
product is the inhaler, used for delivering medication into the body through
one’s lungs. In 2008, the FDA instituted regulations requiring all inhalers to
stop using ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbon propellants (CFCs). 227 This
led many companies to develop new inhaler designs that were intended to
work with new, less environmentally harmful, propellants. 228 In turn, many
of these companies began patenting features of these new inhaler designs.
This caused many off-patent medications to be newly marketed with onpatent inhalers at double or triple the price of their earlier CFC inhaler
counterparts. 229
Permitting companies to extend the patent protection on a drug
through incremental advances in the delivery system of devices may have
some potential to increase the medication’s therapeutic value by
See Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195.
Id.
Id.
Kelly Tunney, How Many People Use EpiPens in America? Mylan’s Price Increase Is
Taking
Advantage
of
Its
Users,
BUSTLE
(Aug.
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Darrell Hulisz, The Soaring Price of EpiPen, RN.COM, https://www.rn.com/featuredstories/the-soaring-price-of-epipen/ [https://perma.cc/Y7WB-RP5L] (last visited Mar. 10,
2020).
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2018), https://www.drugs.com/article/epipen-cost-alternatives.html [https://perma.cc/7Y7CQ5PA].
See Leslie Hendeles, Gene L. Colice & Robert J. Meyer, Withdrawal of Albuterol Inhalers
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incentivizing the development of a more effective delivery system. 230
However, this therapeutic value must be evaluated against its other negative
effects. In addition to raising costs for medications, increased modifications
to mechanical aspects of the delivery device may also “increase the risk of
product recalls, manufacturing errors, and device failures,” while requiring
physicians to continuously retrain on how the modified device works. 231
Although not explicitly linked to patent incentives, several drug delivery
devices have undergone large-scale recalls in the last three years alone. 232
Continuing to make trivial modifications on these devices may increase the
likelihood of issues in the device design or manufacturing process. 233 Such
events show the seriousness of the situation and the potentially dangerous
effects of the abuse of the patent system when it comes to pharmaceuticals.

D. Proposed Solutions
Before taking action to prevent drug companies from engaging in this
tertiary form of evergreening, it is important to properly define what conduct
actually constitutes evergreening and should be prohibited. A general
definition of patent evergreening would include any secondary or tertiary
patent that extends the exclusivity period of the product without providing
any proportionate benefit. 234 Under this definition, many patents covering
improvements to device-delivery systems could still be patented and used to
extend the product’s exclusivity period.
Another possibility could be to define evergreening in a more healthspecific way. Under the health-specific definition, any secondary or tertiary
patent that extends the product’s exclusivity period without a proportionate
therapeutic benefit would qualify. 235 As an example, the patented inhalers
developed following the FDA’s prohibition on CFC inhalers did benefit
society by preventing harmful emission of CFCs even though they did not
produce any health-related benefits to the users. 236 Under the definitions
above, these types of modifications would fall under the health-specific
definition but would not be considered evergreening under the general
definition.

230
231
232
233
234
235
236

Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 143.
Id.
Id. at 143–44.
Id.
Beall et al., supra note 39.
Id.
Id.

2020]

MINOR ADVANCES, MAJOR CONSEQUENCES

683

1. The Indian Approach
In 2005, India adopted this health-specific definition and took a major
step against all types of secondary and tertiary patent evergreening by
requiring new patent applicants to show that their inventions result in
enhanced therapeutic efficacy compared to a known compound. 237 To make
this showing, Indian patent applicants must now demonstrate therapeutic
improvement by way of sufficient clinical evidence. 238 Unfortunately, at least
one study suggests that actions taken by the Indian government have not
done much to curb secondary patenting and that seventy-two percent of
secondary patents on drugs were allegedly incorrectly granted to
applicants. 239 According to this study, conditional exceptions to the antievergreening therapeutic efficacy statute allowed drug companies to
circumvent its restrictions and obtain patents despite failing to show
therapeutic improvements. 240
The United States could amend its laws in several ways to combat
tertiary pharmaceutical patent evergreening. First, one option could be to
adopt a similar prohibition as India against advances that do not provide
enhanced therapeutic efficacy. However, should the United States adopt
similar legislation, lawmakers should look to achievements and
shortcomings in the Indian anti-evergreening statutes to ensure that U.S.
laws will serve their intended purpose and be fairly enforced. One option
for doing so could be to permit generic companies to show that the
proposed advance does not lead to a significant increase in therapeutic
efficacy over traditional therapies and allow such evidence to invalidate a
patent. However, such regulations would likely dramatically increase the
expense of pharmaceutical patent litigation, as each side would probably
end up having to fund clinical studies to demonstrate therapeutic efficacy
and spend additional time and money litigating the merits of each study.
Because branded companies have much higher profit margins and likely
greater resources to spend in such a fight against a generic competitor, it is

Shrimant Singh, India: India’s Tryst with “Evergreening”—An Ongoing Battle, MONDAQ
(Nov. 28, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/758788/Patent/Indias+tryst+with+
Evergreening+An+ongoing+battle [https://perma.cc/2453-JQAL].
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unlikely that this proposed solution would cause generic companies to fare
much better than in the Indian system. 241

2. The Skinny Labeling Approach
A second solution could be for the FDA to allow generic companies
to follow a similar methodology as that for skinny labeling discussed in
Section III.A. In skinny labeling, generics are permitted to list an offpatented use of the drug on its label, which doctors can then prescribe to
patients for an on-patent use. 242 Likewise, if the FDA permitted generic
companies to market the drug using an off-patent, previously approved
version of a delivery device, generic companies could enter the market and
offer cheaper alternatives. Branded companies would still have the
opportunity to compete with generics by making patented, beneficial
developments to the device design; however, consumers would have more
power to determine whether the improvement is worth paying the higher
cost of the branded drug.
Such a solution may require modifications to the Hatch-Waxman Act
and the Orange Book. In the current state, if a generic drug company
wanted to market a drug using an off-patent delivery device, it would still
have to make a paragraph IV certification that they are not infringing the
newer, on-patent device improvements listed in the Orange Book. 243 As
discussed in Section II.D. and illustrated by the Seldane example, such a
certification could expose the company to expensive patent litigation and a
thirty-month stay of FDA approval, even though they are in no way
infringing the device patent. 244
To prevent this problem, the FDA could introduce a different segment
in the Orange Book, where certain other broader categories of device
patents could be listed. 245 Additionally, if the Hatch-Waxman Act is revised
so that generic companies would not have to make a paragraph IV
certification and be subject to litigation when designing around these
broader device patents, generic companies may be much more likely to

See CURT D. FURBERG, BENGT D. FURBERG & LARRY D. SASICH, KNOWING YOUR
MEDICATIONS: A GUIDE TO BECOMING AN INFORMED PATIENT 56 (2010),
https://www.express-scripts.com/art/pdf/kap17Medications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3H398JM8].
Rai & Rice, supra note 84.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2018).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2018).
Beall et al., supra note 39, at 12.
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enter markets for off-patent drugs that are only currently protected by device
patents. 246
In this case, if generic companies were infringing the patents for the
drug-delivery device, the patent holder could certainly still sue them for
patent infringement, as would be the case in almost any other industry.
Here, however, the Hatch-Waxman Act would not impose an automatic
thirty-month stay or otherwise prevent approval of the generic by the FDA.
Thus, patients in need of the drugs could still have access to these low-cost
generic alternatives while the branded and generic companies litigate the
patent infringement suit.
The Orange Book would still perform its function of informing generic
companies that wish to enter a particular pharmaceutical market of the
relevant patents without imposing Hatch-Waxman restrictions that block
them from entering the market. 247 However, under this model, there would
be a need to decide which patents should be listed in which section of the
Orange Book, as branded companies would be unlikely to voluntarily list
their patents in the less enforceable section. If this solution were to be
adopted, it could be left to manufacturers to comply with the FDA
guidelines in good faith, or risk facing anti-trust liability, as was expressed by
the First Circuit. 248 Alternatively, it may fall to the FDA—as the regulatory
agency in charge of the Orange Book—to take a more hands-on approach
to determine what patents should be listed in which section. 249
Although the FDA has made it clear that the agency does not want to
be in the business of policing Orange Book listings for fear of directing
litigation toward itself, it may be time for the FDA to get involved. 250 The
current system shifts the social expenses of Hatch-Waxman gamesmanship
to the patients paying for and relying on the drugs at issue. 251 Though the
Hatch-Waxman Act is intended to expedite generic market entry, by
This is because various provisions within the Hatch-Waxman Act serve to deter generics
from entering the market. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2018).
Orange Book Preface, supra note 50 (“The Addendum to this publication identifies drugs
that have qualified under the FD&C Act for periods of exclusivity and provides patent
information concerning the approved drug products in the Orange Book.”).
Cesar Castillo, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC (In re Lantus Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litig.), 950 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that the absence of good faith adherence by a
branded manufacturer supports a finding of anti-trust liability).
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designing a system where generics have to wait on FDA approval and litigate
with branded companies every time branded companies abuse the rules, the
legislation may have the opposite effect.
The FDA maintains that it does not have the expertise to determine
whether patents in the Orange Book apply to the product and purports to
push the question downstream for courts to determine during HatchWaxman litigation. 252 However, as Orange Book patents become less and
less related to their corresponding products, perhaps it is time that the FDA
develops this expertise. Creating some sort of pre-litigation administrative
pathway for settling listing disputes between branded companies and the
FDA could help filter out some of the feared claims. 253 Settling these
disputes before generics attempt to enter the market would likely promote
faster access to low-cost medication.
A foreseeable issue with the skinny labeling approach could be that it
would incentivize branded companies to recreate the model of the rescue
drug, as described in Section III.A.3. Similar to how branded companies
created uses for drugs that had not yet been approved for any use, branded
companies may attempt to patent devices to be used with medications that
have never previously been approved for use with a device. 254 Such a tactic
could have the effect of unnecessarily increasing the number of devices used
in combination with pharmaceutical products on the market as branded
companies would be incentivized to pair devices with drugs not for
therapeutic improvements but for extending the life of their patent
protection. If the branded company were to accompany this new device
pairing with a product hop away from non-device treatment, they may be
successful in blocking out the generic competition that seeks only to sell the
pharmaceutical product. 255 However, this issue could likely be avoided if the
FDA also permits generic companies to market the pharmaceutical when
an off-patent, previously approved version of the drug exists without a
device.

3. The All-Up-Front Approach
Third, in addition to, or in place of, creating an additional segment
within the Orange Book, the FDA could also mandate that branded
Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace, supra note
250, at 64–65 (indicating that the courts should be assessing the validity of the listed patents
because the FDA does not have the expertise).
Id. at 64.
See supra Section III.A.3.
This is because there would be no earlier-version off-patent device that could be substituted
for the new patented device. See supra Section III.B.2.
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companies list all device-related patents in the Orange Book when the drug
is first placed on the market. 256 This would allow branded companies to
enjoy the same protections afforded by the Hatch-Waxman Act for a limited
period and simultaneously prevent them from listing new deviceimprovement patents after the cutoff date. Again, doing so would allow
branded companies to sue generics outside of the Hatch-Waxman
framework, but there would be less motivation to do so because of the
unavailability of the thirty-month stay provision.
However, a foreseeable problem of this proposed solution is that
generics might be less well informed on existing patents related to the
device, as branded companies may no longer have to publicly list patents
obtained after the market date in the Orange Book. This could result in
generic companies unknowingly infringing on patented products or being
forced to incur additional costs of conducting extensive freedom-to-operate
research prior to marketing new products.
In light of the above discussion, the best solution is likely the second,
“skinny labeling” option with corresponding amendments to the HatchWaxman Act. This solution seems to best allow branded companies to
benefit from making genuinely beneficial device improvements to therapies
while preserving the public’s access to greatly needed pharmaceutical
products. Moreover, this option does not have the same inherent issues of
leaving generic companies uninformed about branded patents, as seen in
option three, 257 or having the potential to dramatically increase the costs of
the pharmaceutical patent system, as seen in option one. 258
V. CONCLUSION
Due in part to the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
pharmaceutical patent evergreening has become extremely profitable for
branded drug companies seeking to prevent generic companies from
entering the market. Although not a new phenomenon, branded companies
have continued to explore and use new methods to delay or prevent generic
entry into the market, at which point the price of their drugs may decrease
as much as ninety percent. 259 While courts and lawmakers have been
successful in preventing some abuse of the system by amending provisions
of the Hatch-Waxman Act and applying antitrust law, companies have
recently begun to use patents on medical devices related to the drug product
to restrict generic competition.
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This new method of achieving patent exclusivity may have serious
consequences for patients using the product, as can be seen in recent price
increases with the EpiPen and inhaler products. Additionally, increased
modifications could increase the likelihood of product defects or recalls,
further injuring patients. To combat abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act
through device patenting, lawmakers should consider amending the Orange
Book regulations and the Hatch-Waxman Act to reflect what has been
allowed by skinny labeling. In this way, the United States might prevent
minimal incremental advances in delivery devices from blocking generic
entry and the public’s access to much needed pharmaceuticals.
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